ABSTRACT
I. Introduction
Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can elicit effort from their employees by paying supra-competitive (i.e. efficiency) wages and/or by devoting resources to monitoring. This trade-off between the level of remuneration and monitoring has been examined extensively in the literature. Supportive evidence is found by Groshen and Krueger (1990) , Rebitzer (1995) , Krueger (1991) , Kruse (1992) , Ewing and Payne (1999) . Unsupportive evidence is found by Neal (1993) , Fitzroy and Kraft (1986) and Brunello (1995) .
A third option available to the firm is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the lure of higher future earnings acts as a deterrent to current shirking. The positive correlation between experience and earnings is one of the most robust and uncontentious findings in labour economics -for surveys of the literature, see Polachek and Siebert (1992) and Lazear (2000) . It has long been observed that worker productivity is inexorably linked to the form of the compensation scheme [Mitchell et al. (1990) ]. From the early work of Johnson (1950) , Cheung (1969) and Ross (1973) , a recurring theme of this literature is that the divergence of interests and the asymmetry of information between principal and agent cause output to depend upon the contingent nature of the compensation contract. The prohibitive cost of monitoring worker performance necessitates compensation schemes that induce workers to self-select behaviour the firm considers to be optimal. One method of doing this is to defer a substantial component of compensation until the later years of tenure.
Such a wage profile provides a penalty for shirking and thereby encourages workers to work efficiently over their employment-cycle. Intuitively, by paying short-tenure workers less than their marginal product, and long-tenure workers conversely more, the firm is able to keep the present value of wages equal to the present value of productivity. This provides incentives to workers that would be absent if they were to be paid a wage that more closely followed 4 productivity over their employment-cycle. Essentially, steep profiles provide ex post rents that the worker is reluctant to lose. If reducing effort increases the probability of involuntary termination, then steep profiles increase the cost of shirking, thereby encouraging workers to raise their effort level, and in this sense represent a form of efficiency wage payment [Lazear (1979 [Lazear ( , 1981 ].
The competing explanation for positive earnings profiles is derived from the general human capital model. This posits that workers become more productive, and hence better remunerated, over time on account of investments in human capital or training. Training investments can be either of a general, readily transferable variety or of a specific, nontransferable variety, both of which increase a worker's productivity over time in the current firm. The human capital thesis suggests that it is the return to this investment, with initial relatively low and subsequent relatively high real wages, which causes the earnings profile to have an upward slope [Becker (1975) , Ben-Porath (1967) , Mincer (1958 Mincer ( , 1974 ]. Wage growth is therefore equivalent to the return to investment in on-the-job training plus the change (i.e. reduction) in the investment from period to period minus any depreciation of the stock of human capital. Larger amounts of on-the-job training will result in steeper wage profiles. Recent work in this area has emphasised the plausibility of other explanations. For example, search models generally predict that more time in the labour marker increases the chance of finding a better match and thus tends to be associated with higher earnings [Burdett (1978) , Ruhm (1991) , Jacobson and LaLonde (1993) , Manning (1997) ].
Alternatively, workers may prefer rising earnings profiles as a form of forced saving [Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) , Frank and Hutchens (1993) ].
In what follows we set out a simple, two-period model of efficiency wages that highlights the relationship between monitoring and the wage-tenure profile. The model suggests that there is a trade-off between current period monitoring and the slope of the 5 profile. We then empirically test this prediction using a matched sample of British employeremployer data. Our aim is to answer what is, perhaps, one of the key questions in labour economics:
Personnel economics has grown over the past twenty years to become a major branch of labour economics. Although much has been learned, many important questions remain. For example, are worker wage profiles dependent on individual attributes or is the firm more important in determining wage growth. [Lazear (2000) , p.611].
The paper is set out as follows: Section II outlines our theoretical model, Section III discusses our data and methodology, Section IV sets out our empirical results and Section V concludes.
II. Theoretical Model
Assume for ease of analytical exposition that workers are homogenous risk neutral with a the probability that a shirker will be detected. To avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that the criteria on which this judgement is based are verifiable by an independent arbitrator such that there is no dispute about the firm's assessment. . We assume
It is thus technically possible for the firm to perfectly monitor worker performance. Since our focus of interest is not the optimal level of monitoring, we assume that production and monitoring technologies are such that it is always in the interests of the 6 firm to monitor imperfectly. Detection implies instantaneous dismissal and unemployment utility b.
The firm's problem is to maximize profits subject to the constraints that workers receives at least their reservation wage, r w e b = + , and that, once employed, they do not shirk. A 'spot-market' employment contract will therefore necessitate workers being paid the lowest wage that satisfies the single period 'non-shirking constraint' (NSC):
Satisfaction of (1) 
Intuitively, workers acquire rents on account of the firm's inability to perfectly monitor. The firm, however, can reduce these rents by offering lifetime contracts that induce workers to queue up to access the second period wage that exceeds their reservation utility. It is apparent that increased monitoring on the part of the firm assuages the slope of this profile:
There is thus a trade-off between the quantity of resources devoted to monitoring by the firm and the slope of the experience earnings profile.
III. Data and Methodology

Data
Our data are derived from the 1998 and 2004 Cross-Section Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS). These are the fourth and fifth instalments of a Government funded series of surveys conducted at British workplaces. The previous surveys were conducted in 1980, 1984 and 1990 .
The sample of workplaces was randomly drawn from the Interdepartmental Business
Register (IDBR). This is maintained by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and is considered to be the highest quality sampling frame of workplaces available in the United
Kingdom. The sample is stratified by workplace size and industry and larger workplaces and 8 some industries are over represented [Chaplin et al. (2005) ]. A workplace is defined as the activities of a single employer at a single set of premises.
The survey comprises three main sections; the 'Management Questionnaire' (face-toface interviews with senior managers with day-to-day responsibility for employee relations), the 'Worker Representative Questionnaire', and the 'Employee Questionnaire'. The survey population for the Management questionnaire is all British workplaces barring those in agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying, private households with employed persons, and extra-territorial organisations.
The response rate in the 1998 (2004) Management Questionnaire was 80% (64%).
The respective figure for the Employee Questionnaire was 66% (61%) [Airey et al. (1999) and Kersley et al. (2006) for reasons why the response rates differ]. At those workplaces responding to the manager survey, a questionnaire was presented to 25 randomly selected employees in workplaces with more than 25 employees or to all the employees in workplaces with fewer than 25 employees.
Changes in the nature of interest in employment relations led to substantial redesign of the 2004 wave. A major modification was the incorporation of small workplaces (i.e. those employing between 5 and 9 employees). There were also a number of changes to the format of the various survey questions [Kersley et al. (2006) ].
For the purposes of our study we combine the data from the Management and Employee Questionnaires. Thus, our 1998 Thus, our (2004 employees linked to a set of 1744 (1509) establishments. Due to the stratified nature of the survey, we weight our estimates in order to be representative of the sampling population.
Summary statistics of our variables of interest are presented in Tables 3a and 3b (Appendix).
Methodology
Our equation of interest is: Following Leonard (1987) , Gordon (1990 Gordon ( , 1994 Drago and Perlman (1989) support the use of supervision as a proxy for monitoring, although they acknowledge that supervision may occur for non-monitoring purposes -for example, to co-ordinate production. Indeed, monitoring may not entail direct supervision but may instead rely on factors such as output measurement and piece rates. More problematic, the number of supervisors might be high because monitoring is difficult [Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002) ] or that supervisors only spend a fraction of work time monitoring definitions and summary statistics for the explanatory variables are detailed in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. ' (Answer: Yes; No) . We drop these respondents from the sample. Cross tabulations indicate that these latter were overwhelmingly managerial and professional staff.
The discrete nature of our 'raw' monitoring variable renders statistical interpretation of its effect on the wage-tenure profile somewhat difficult. We therefore impute a continous value of monitoring for each firm in the sample by estimating a fitted version of (5):
ˆj m denotes the 'fitted' level of monitoring within firm j and j Θ is a vector of explanatory variables that influence this level of monitoring. 3 We are thus able to infer from 3 β the effect [Rebitzer (1995) ]. Despite these problems, the relative paucity of data compels us to rely on the proxy defined above. One exception is Kruse (1992) who proxies monitoring by an employee reported measure of how often the supervisor checks his work.
on the profile of a unit increase in monitoring. We estimate equation (6) via a linear probability model, the results of which are set out in Table 4 (Appendix).
4
Given the categorical nature of the wage variable, we estimate both (5) and (6) 
IV. Results
Our results are set out in Tables 5 and 6 Our results for both specifications across the two samples are consistent with the standard human capital model of wages and, for brevity, we do not discuss them. We instead focus on the salient feature of our empirical analysis, namely the relationship between monitoring and the shape of the wage-tenure profile. Considering Table 5 , it is apparent that higher fitted monitoring (Fitted Monitorng) impacts negatively on the wage profile. Thus in 4 We also estimate a fitted version of (5) using an ordered probit model to predict monitoring. Our results from this exercise remain qualitatively the same and are available on request. 5 Respondents in the 1998 survey were asked to place their pay level within 12 bands, chosen to approximate decile bands and the top and bottom 5% of the earnings distribution as estimated from the 1996 New Earnings Survey. The available bands were: less than £50, £51-£80, £81-£140, £141-£180, £181-£220,£221-£260, £261-£310, £311-£360, £361-£430, £431-£540, £541-£680, £681 or more. The number of bands was increased to 14 in 2004: less than £50, £51-£80, £81-£110, £111-£140, £141-£180, £181-£220, £221-£260, £261-£310, £311-£360, £361-£430, £431-£540, £541-£680, £681-£870, £871 or more. We construct lower and upper bounds of wages by taking the mid-points of each band and then aggregating. 6 Our results for 2004 are based on a sample of all workplaces surveyed. Restricting the sample to establishments with more than 10 employees, in order to render the sample comparable with the 1998 sample, does not affect our results. These results are available from the authors on request.
1998, a unit increase in Fitted Monitoring reduces the slope of the wage profile by 1.7
percent for each year of tenure. Considering ambiguous, evidence on the relationship between monitoring and wages [Goerke (2001) , Walsh (1999) ]. Increased levels of monitoring have been found to impact both positively and negatively on wages, with negative effects being found for high effort workers [Strobl and Walsh (2007) ].
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V. Final Comments
Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can elicit effort from their employees by paying supra-competitive (i.e. efficiency) wages and/or by devoting resources to monitoring.
Another option available to firms is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the prospect of higher future earnings acts as a deterrent to current period shirking. It follows, therefore, that a potential trade-off, and one not hitherto investigated in the literature, is that between the level of monitoring and the shape of the wage-tenure profile.
We have explored these predictions using two cross-section surveys of matched employer-employee data for Britain. Our results suggest an inverse relationship between the level of monitoring and the slope of the wage-tenure profile, and may be interpreted as further evidence of efficiency wage theory. They also support the view that it is agency rather than human capital considerations that drive the wage-tenure profile. It would appear that British establishments elicit optimal effort from their employees by trading off higher current period monitoring against future wage rents. Whether or not this strategy is replicated by firms in other countries is an issue for future research. 
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